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Abstract
This paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of land ownership adversely a⁄ected the emer-
gence of human capital promoting institutions (e.g., public schooling) and thus the pace and the nature of
the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing to the emergence of the great
divergence in income per capita across countries. The prediction of the theory regarding the adverse
e⁄ect of the concentration of land ownership on education expenditure is established empirically based
on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the US.
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11 Introduction
The last two centuries have been characterized by a great divergence in income per capita across the globe.
The ratio of GDP per capita between the richest and the poorest regions of the world has widened consider-
ably from a modest 3 to 1 ratio in 1820 to an 18 to 1 ratio in 2001 (Maddison, 2001). The role of geographical
and institutional factors, human capital formation, ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, colo-
nization and globalization has been the center of a debate about the origin of the di⁄erential timing of the
transition from stagnation to growth and the remarkable change in the world income distribution.
This paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of land ownership adversely a⁄ected the emer-
gence of human capital promoting institutions (public schooling and child labor regulations) and thus the
pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing to the
emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries.1 The theory further suggests that
some land abundant countries that were characterized by an unequal distribution of land, were overtaken in
the process of industrialization by land scarce countries in which land distribution was rather equal.
The transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy has changed the nature of the main
economic con￿ ict in society. Unlike the agrarian economy which was characterized by a con￿ ict of inter-
est between the landed aristocracy and the masses, the process of industrialization has brought about an
additional con￿ ict between the entrenched landed elite and the emerging capitalists elite. The capitalists
who were striving for an educated labor force supported policies that promoted the education of the masses,
whereas landowners, whose interest lied in the reduction of the mobility of the rural labor force, favored
policies that deprived the masses from education.
The process of industrialization raised the importance of human capital in the production process,
re￿ ecting its complementarity with physical capital and technology. Investment in human capital, however,
has been sub-optimal due to credit markets imperfections, and public investment in education has been
therefore growth enhancing.2 Nevertheless, human capital accumulation has not bene￿ted all sectors of the
economy. In light of a lower degree of complementarity between human capital and land,3 a rise in the level
of education increased the productivity of labor in industrial production more than in agriculture, decreasing
the return to land due to labor migration, and the associated rise in wages. Landowners, therefore, had no
economic incentives to support these growth enhancing educational policies as long as their stake in the
productivity of the industrial sector was insu¢ cient.4
The proposed theory suggests that the adverse e⁄ect of the implementation of public education on
landowners￿ income from agricultural production is magni￿ed by the concentration of land ownership.5
1Most of the existing studies (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999), attribute the di⁄erences in income per-capita across countries
largely to di⁄erences in TFP, whereas some (e.g., Manuali and Seshadri, 2005) provide evidence in favor of the dominating role
of human capital. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if the direct role of human capital is limited, it has a large indirect
e⁄ect on growth via its e⁄ect on technological progress and the implementation of growth enhancing institutions (Glaeser et
al., 2004).
2See Galor and Zeira (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), and Benabou (2000).
3Although rapid technological change in the agricultural sector may increase the return to human capital (e.g., Foster
and Rosenzweig, 1996), the return to education is typically lower in the agricultural sector, as evident by the distribution
of employment. For instance, as reported by the U.S. department of Agriculture (1998), 56.9% of agricultural employment
consists of high school dropouts, in contrast to an average of 13.7% in the economy as a whole. Similarly, 16.6% of agricultural
employment consists of workers with 13 or more years of schooling, in contrast to an average of 54.5% in the economy as a
whole.
4Landowners may bene￿t from the economic development of other segments of the economy due to capital ownership,
household￿ s labor supply to the industrial sector, the provision of public goods, and demand spillover from economic development
of the urban sector.
5The proposed mechanism focuses on the emergence of public education. Alternatively, one could have focused on child
1Hence, as long as landowners a⁄ect the political process and thereby the implementation of education reforms,
inequality in the distribution of land ownership is a hurdle for human capital accumulation, slowing the
process of industrialization and the transition to modern growth.6
Economies in which land was rather equally distributed, implemented earlier public education, and
bene￿ted from the emergence of a skill-intensive industrial sector and a rapid process of development. In
contrast, among economies marked by an unequal distribution of land ownership, land abundance that was
a source of richness in early stages of development, led in later stages to under-investment in human capital,
an unskilled-intensive industrial sector, and a slower growth process. Thus, variations in the distribution
of land ownership across countries generated variations in the industrial composition of the economy, and
thereby the observed diverging development patterns across the globe.7
The prediction of the theory regarding the adverse e⁄ect of the concentration of land ownership on
education expenditure is con￿rmed empirically based on data from the beginning of the 20th century in the
US. Variations in public spending on education across states in the US during the high school movement
are utilized in order to examine the thesis that inequality in the distribution of landownership was a hurdle
for public investment in human capital. In addition, historical evidence suggests that indeed the distribution
of land ownership a⁄ected the nature of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy and has
been signi￿cant in the emergence of sustained di⁄erences in human capital formation and growth patterns
across countries.
The next section places the research in the context of the existing literature. Section 3 and 4 develop
the theoretical model and its testable predictions. Section 5 provides anecdotal historical evidence that are
consistent with the proposed hypothesis. Section 6 examines empirically the hypothesis that the concentra-
tion of land ownership had an adverse e⁄ect on education expenditure based on the US experience during
the high school movement, and Section 7 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The central role of human capital formation in the transition from stagnation to growth is underlined in
uni￿ed growth theory (Galor, 2005). This research establishes theoretically (Galor and Weil, 2000, Galor
and Moav, 2002) and quantitatively (Doepke, 2004, Fernandez-Villaverde, 2005, and Lagerlof, 2006) that
the rise in the demand for human capital in the process of industrialization and its e⁄ect on human capital
formation, technological progress, and the onset of the demographic transition, have been the prime forces
in the transition from stagnation to growth. As the demand for human capital emerged, variations in the
extensiveness of human capital formation and therefore in the rate of technological progress and the timing
of the demographic transition, signi￿cantly a⁄ected the distribution of income in the world economy (Galor
and Mountford, 2006, 2008 and Voigtl￿nder and Voth 2006).
The proposed theory suggests that the concentration of land ownership has been a major hurdle in
the emergence of human capital promoting institutions. Thus the observed variations in human capital
labor regulation, linking it to human capital formation as in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), or on the endogenous abolishment of
slavery (e.g., Lagerlof, 2003) and the incentives it creates for investment in human capital.
6Consistent with the proposed theory, Besley and Burgess (2000) ￿nd that over the period 1958-1992 in India, land reforms
have raised agricultural wages, despite an adverse e⁄ect on agricultural output.
7As established by Chanda and Dalgaard (2003), variations in the allocation of inputs between the agriculture and the non-
agriculture sectors are important determinants of international di⁄erences in TFP, accounting for between 30 and 50 percents
of these variations.
2formation and in the emergence of divergence and overtaking in economic performance, is attributed to the
historical di⁄erences in the distribution of land ownership across countries. In addition to our own ￿ndings
that land inequality had a signi￿cant adverse e⁄ect on education expenditure in the US, the predictions
of the theory are consistent with the ￿ndings by Deininger and Squire, (1998) and Easterly (2007) about
the inverse relationship across countries between land inequality (across landowners), on the one hand, and
human capital formation and growth, on the other hand.8
The role of institutional factors has been the focus of an alternative hypothesis regarding the origin
of the great divergence. North (1981), Landes (1998), Mokyr (1990, 2002), Parente and Prescott (2000),
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) have argued that institutions that
facilitated the protection of property rights, enhancing technological research and the di⁄usion of knowledge,
have been the prime factor that enabled the earlier European take-o⁄ and the great technological divergence
across the globe.
The e⁄ect of geographical factors on economic growth and the great divergence have been emphasized
by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Hibbs and Olson (2005). The geographical
hypothesis suggests that favorable geographical conditions permitted an earlier transition to agriculture in
Europe and made it less vulnerable to the risk associated with climate and diseases, leading to the early
European take-o⁄, whereas adverse geographical conditions in disadvantageous regions, generated permanent
hurdles for the process of development.
The exogenous nature of the geographical factors and the inherent endogeneity of the institutional
factors led researchers to hypothesize that initial geographical conditions had a persistent e⁄ect on the quality
of institutions, leading to divergence and overtaking in economic performance.9 Engerman and Sokolo⁄
(2000) - ES - provide descriptive evidence that geographical conditions that led to income inequality, brought
about oppressive institutions (e.g., restricted access to the democratic process and to education) designed
to maintain the political power of the elite and to preserve the existing inequality, whereas geographical
characteristics that generated an equal distribution of income led to the emergence of growth promoting
institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) - AJR - provide evidence that reversals in economic
performance across countries have a colonial origin, re￿ ecting institutional reversals that were introduced by
European colonialism across the globe. ￿Reversals of fortune￿re￿ ect the imposition of extractive institutions
by the European colonialists in regions where favorable geographical conditions led to prosperity, and the
implementation of growth enhancing institutions in poorer regions.10
The proposed theory di⁄ers in several important dimensions from the earlier analysis of the relation-
ship between geographical factors, inequality, and institutions. First, it suggests that a con￿ ict of interest
between landowners and landless individuals, and in particular, among the economic elites (i.e., industrialists
and landowners), rather than between the ruling elite and the masses as argued by ES and AJR, brought
about the delay in the implementation of growth enhancing educational policies.11 Hence, in contrast to the
viewpoint of ES and AJR about the persistent desirability of extractive institutions for the ruling elite, the
8Furthermore, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that historically landlord-dominated districts of West Bengal in India fare
worse on agricultural productivity and schooling than small-holder districts.
9The role of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization in the emergence of divergence and ￿growth tragedies￿has been
linked to their e⁄ect on the quality of institutions (Easterly and Levine, 1997).
10Additional aspects of the role of colonialism in comparative developments are analyzed by Bertocchi and Canova (2002).
Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993), in contrast, attribute technological leapfrogging to the acquired comparative advantage
of the current technological leaders in the use of the existing technologies (via learning by doing).
11The role of a con￿ict of interest within economic elites in economic and political transformation was examined earlier by
Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby (2005), as well as others.
3proposed theory suggests that the implementation of growth promoting institutions emerges in the process
of development as the economic interest of the two elites in the e¢ cient operation of the industrial sector
dominates. Second, consistent with existing cross sectional evidence and the evidence presented in this pa-
per, the theory underlines the adverse e⁄ect of unequal distribution of land ownership (rather than wealth
inequality as suggested by ES) in the timing of educational reforms. Third, the theory focuses on the direct
economic incentive (i.e., the adverse e⁄ect of education reforms on the land rental rate) that induces the
landed elite to block education reforms, rather than on the e⁄ect of political reforms on the distribution
of political power and thus the degree of rent extraction. Hence, unlike ES, and AJR, even if the political
structure remains unchanged, economic development may ultimately trigger the implementation of growth
promoting institutions.12
A complementary approach suggests that interest groups (e.g., landed aristocracy and monopolies)
block the introduction of new technologies and superior institutions in order to protect their political power
and thus maintain their rent extraction. Olson (1982), Mokyr (1990), Parente and Prescott (2000), and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argue that this type of con￿ ict, in the context of technology adoption,
has played an important role throughout the evolution of industrial societies.13 Interestingly, the political
economy interpretation of our theory suggests, in contrast, that the industrial elite would relinquish power
to the masses in order to overcome the desire of the landed elite to block economic development.14
Empirical research is inconclusive about the signi￿cance of human capital rather than institutional
factors in the process of development. Some researchers suggest that initial geographical conditions a⁄ected
the current economic performance primarily via their e⁄ect on institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) provide evidence that
variations in the contemporary growth processes across countries can be attributed to institutional factors
whereas geographical factors are secondary, operating primarily via variations in institutions. Moreover,
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) demonstrate that geopolitical factors brought about a
high degree of fractionalization in some regions of the world, leading to the implementation of institutions
that are not conducive for economic growth and thereby to diverging growth paths across regions.
Glaeser et al. (2004) revisit the debate whether political institutions cause economic growth, or
whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. In con-
trast to earlier studies, they ￿nd that human capital is a more fundamental source of growth than political
institutions (i.e., risk of expropriation by the government, government e⁄ectiveness, and constraints on the
executives). Moreover, they argue that poor countries emerge from poverty through good policies (e.g.,
human capital promoting policies) and only subsequently improve their political institutions.
Finally, the paper contributes to the political economy approach to the relationship between inequal-
ity, redistribution and economic growth. This literature argued initially that inequality generates political
pressure to adopt redistributive policies, and that the distortionary taxation that is associated with these poli-
cies adversely a⁄ects investment and economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson and Tabellini,
12In contrast to the political economy mechanism proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2000), where land concentration induces
landowners to divert resources in their favor via distortionary taxation, in the proposed theory land concentration induces lower
taxation so as to assure lower public expenditure on education, resulting in a lower economic growth. The proposed theory is
therefore consistent with empirical ￿ndings that taxation is positively related to economic growth and negatively to inequality
(e.g., Benabou, 1996 and Perotti, 1996). Bowles (1978) discusses the incentives of landlords to restrict access to education in
order to preserve a relatively cheap labor force.
13Barriers to technological adoption that may lead to divergence are explored by Caselli and Coleman (2001), Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) as well.
14See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Ghosal and Proto (2005) as well.
41994). Existing evidence, however, do not support either of the two underlying mechanisms (Perotti, 1996).
In contrast, the proposed theory suggests that inequality (in the distribution of land ownership) is in fact a
barrier for redistribution and growth promoting educational policy, provided that landowners have su¢ cient
political power. This mechanism resembles the one advanced by Benabou (2000) in his exploration of the
relationship between redistribution and growth. He demonstrates that a country would implement an e¢ -
cient tax policy and converge to a higher income steady-state, provided that the initial level of inequality
is low and that the better endowed agents have therefore limited interest to lobby against it. Otherwise
the e¢ cient redistribution will be blocked, perpetuating initial inequality and con￿ning the economy to a
low-income steady-state.15
3 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in a process of development. In every period the economy
produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment. The good is produced
in an agricultural sector and in a manufacturing sector using land, physical and human capital as well as
raw labor. The stock of physical capital in every period is the output produced in the preceding period
net of consumption and human capital investment, whereas the stock of human capital in every period is
determined by the aggregate public investment in education in the preceding period. The supply of land is
￿xed over time. Physical capital accumulation raises the demand for human capital and output grows due
to the accumulation of physical and human capital.16
At the outset, the economy consists of three groups of individuals. An homogenous group of landown-
ers, an homogeneous group of landless capitalists, and homogeneous group of workers who are landless and
do not own capital initially. In the process of development, physical capital is accumulated by all groups.
3.1 Production of Final Output
The output in the economy in period t; yt, is given by the aggregate output in the agricultural sector, yA
t ;





3.1.1 The Agricultural Sector
Production in the agricultural sector occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-
scale production technology, using labor and land as inputs. The output produced at time t; yA
t ; is
yA
t = F(Xt;Lt); (2)
where Xt and Lt are land and the number of workers, respectively, employed by the agricultural sector
in period t. Hence, workers￿productivity in the agricultural sector is independent of their level of human
capital. The production function is strictly increasing and concave, the two factors are complements in the
15This mechanism is echoed in Gardstein (2007) that argues that the support for the protection of property rights is greater
the more equal is the distribution of income and the smaller is the political bias. Similarly, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)
suggest that if political participation is determined by the education (socioeconomic status) of citizens, the elite may not ￿nd
it bene￿cial to subsidize universal public education despite the existence of positive externalities from human capital. See also
Benabou (2002) for the trade-o⁄s between redistribution and economic growth.
16Alternatively, the rise in the demand for human capital could have been based on technological progress, and output growth
could have been due to technological progress and factor accumulation. This speci￿cation would not alter the main qualitative
results.
5production process, FXL > 0; and the function satis￿es the neoclassical boundary conditions that assure the
existence of an interior solution to the producers￿pro￿t-maximization problem.
Producers in the agricultural sector operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage
rate per worker, wA
t ; and the rate of return to land, ￿t, producers in period t choose the level of employment
of labor, Lt; and land, Xt; so as to maximize pro￿ts. That is, fXt;Ltg = argmax [F(Xt;Lt)￿wtLt ￿￿tXt]:






Production in the manufacturing sector occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant-returns-
to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production technology using physical and human capital as inputs.17 The output







t ; kt ￿ Kt=Ht; ￿ 2 (0;1); (4)
where Kt and Ht are the quantities of physical capital and human capital (measured in e¢ ciency units)
employed in production at time t: Physical capital depreciates fully after one period. In contrast to the
agricultural sector, human capital has a positive e⁄ect on workers￿productivity in the manufacturing sector.
Producers in the manufacturing sector operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the
wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor, wM
t ; and the rate of return to capital, Rt, producers in period t choose
the level of employment of capital, Kt; and the number of e¢ ciency units of labor, Ht; so as to maximize




t Ht￿RtKt]: The producers￿inverse demand for factors









In every period a generation which consists of a continuum of individuals of measure 1 is born. Individuals
live for two periods. Each individual has a single parent and a single child. Individuals, within as well as
across generations, are identical in their preferences and innate abilities but they may di⁄er in their wealth.
Preferences of individual i who is born in period t (a member i of generation t) are de￿ned over second
period consumption, ci
t+1; and a transfer to the o⁄spring, bi
t+1.18 They are represented by a log-linear utility
function
ui
t = (1 ￿ ￿)lnci
t+1 + ￿ lnbi
t+1; (6)
where ￿ 2 (0;1):
17As will become apparent, the choice of a Cobb-Douglas production function assures that there is no con￿ict of interest
among landless individuals regarding the optimal education policy, permitting the analysis to focus on the con￿ict between the
Landowners and the landless (i.e., capitalists and workers).
18This form of altruistic bequest motive (i.e., the ￿joy of giving￿) is the common form in the recent literature on income
distribution and growth. It is supported empirically by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko⁄ (1997). As discussed in section 4, if
individuals generate utility from the utility of their o⁄spring the qualitative results remain intact. First period consumption
may be viewed as part of the consumption of the parent.
6In the ￿rst period of their lives individuals acquire human capital. In the second period of their lives
individuals join the labor force, allocating the resulting wage income, along with their return to capital and
land, between consumption and income transfer to their children. In addition, individuals transfer their
entire stock of land to their o⁄spring.19
An individual i born in period t receives a transfer, bi
t; in the ￿rst period of life. A fraction ￿t ￿ 0 of
this capital transfer is collected by the government in order to ￿nance public education, whereas a fraction
1￿￿t is saved for future income.20 Individuals devote their ￿rst period for the acquisition of human capital.
Education is provided publicly free of charge. The acquired level of human capital increases with the real
resources invested in public education. The number of e¢ ciency units of human capital of each member of
generation t in period t + 1, ht+1; is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the government real
expenditure on education per member of generation t, et:21
ht+1 = h(et); (7)
where h(0) = 1; limet!0+ h0(et) = 1; and limet!1 h0(et) = 0: Hence, even in the absence of real expenditure
on public education individuals still posses one e¢ ciency unit of human capital - basic skills - assuring the
operation of the industrial sector in every time period.
In the second period of life, members of generation t join the labor force earning the competitive
market wage wt+1: In addition, individual i derives income from capital ownership, bi
t(1￿￿t)Rt+1; and from
the return on land ownership, xi￿t+1; where xi is the quantity of land owned by individual i. The individual￿ s
second period income, Ii
t+1; is therefore
Ii
t+1 = wt+1 + bi
t(1 ￿ ￿t)Rt+1 + xi￿t+1: (8)
A member i of generation t allocates second period income between consumption, ci
t+1; and transfers
to the o⁄spring, bi











t+1; and the indirect utility function of a member i of generation t; vi
t; is therefore




t+1 + ￿ ￿ v(Ii
t+1); (11)
where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ln￿:
19This assumption captures the well established observation (e.g., Bertocchi 2006) that at least in early stages of development
land is not fully tradable due to agency and moral hazard problems. It is designed to assure that landowners could be
meaningfully de￿ned as a distinct viable class. In the present of a market for land, the anticipation of education reforms and
the associated decline in rental rates would generate a decline in the price of land. Thus, as long as land is not fully tradable,
landowners who would be the prime losers from the decline in the price of land would object to education reforms. If land would
be fully traded, land holdings would be equivalent to any other asset holdings, and in contrast to historical evidence, landowners
would not be a signi￿cant force in the political structure of the economy. The proportion of landholding in the portfolio of each
individual should not vary systematically across groups, and thus e¢ cient education policy will be implemented.
20As discussed below, an income tax rather than a bequest tax would complicate the analysis, but would not alter the
qualitative results.
21A more realistic formulation would link the cost of education to (teacher￿ s) wages, which may vary in the process of
development. As can be derived from section 3.4, under both formulations the optimal expenditure on education, et; is an
increasing function of the capital-labor ratio in the economy, and the qualitative results remain therefore intact.
22Note that individual￿ s preferences de￿ned over the transfer to the o⁄spring, bi
t; or over net transfer, (1￿￿t)bi
t; are represented




73.3 Physical Capital, Human Capital, and Output
The aggregate level of intergenerational transfers in period t, as follows from (10), is a fraction ￿ of the
aggregate level of income yt: A fraction ￿t of this capital transfer is collected by the government in order
to ￿nance public education, whereas a fraction 1 ￿ ￿t is saved for future consumption. The capital stock in
period t + 1, Kt+1; is therefore
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt; (12)
whereas the government tax revenues are ￿t￿yt:
Let ￿t+1 be the fraction (and the number - since population is normalized to 1) of workers employed
in the manufacturing sector. The education expenditure per young individual in period t, et, is,
et = ￿t￿yt; (13)
and the stock of human capital, employed in the manufacturing sector in period t + 1, Ht+1; is therefore,
Ht+1 = ￿t+1h(￿t￿yt); (14)
Hence, output in the manufacturing sector in period t + 1 is,
yM
t+1 = [(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt]￿[￿t+1h(￿t￿yt)]1￿￿ ￿ yM(yt;￿t;￿t+1); (15)





where kt+1 is strictly decreasing in ￿t and in ￿t+1, and strictly increasing in yt: As follows from (5), the
capital share in the manufacturing sector is
(1 ￿ ￿t)￿ytRt+1 = ￿yM
t+1; (17)
and the labor share in the manufacturing sector is given by
￿t+1h(￿t￿yt)wM
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)yM
t+1: (18)
The supply of labor to agriculture, Lt+1; is equal to 1￿￿t+1 and the supply of land is ￿xed over time
at a level X > 0: Output in the agriculture sector in period t + 1 is, therefore,
yA
t+1 = F(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1) ￿ yA(￿t+1;X): (19)
As follows from the properties of the production functions both sectors are active in t + 1 as long as
￿t < 1: Hence, since individuals are perfectly mobile between the two sectors they can either supply one unit
of labor to the agriculture sector and receive the wage wA
t+1 or supply ht+1 e¢ ciency units of labor to the




t+1 ￿ wt+1; (20)
and the fraction of employment in the manufacturing sector, ￿t+1; equalizes the marginal product of workers
in the two sectors, and thus maximizes output per capita in the economy.
23Even if mobility between the sectors is not fully unrestricted, the qualitative results would not be altered.
8Lemma 1 The fraction of workers employed by the manufacturing sector in period t + 1, ￿t+1 is uniquely
determined:
￿t+1 = ￿(yt;￿t;X);
where ￿X(yt;￿t;X) < 0; ￿y(yt;￿t;X) > 0; and limy!1 ￿(yt;￿t;X) = 1:
Moreover, ￿t+1 maximizes output in period t + 1; yt+1 :
￿t+1 = argmaxyt+1:
Proof. Substituting (3), (5), and (16) into (20) it follows that






Hence, since @￿(￿t+1;yt;￿t;X)=@￿t+1 > 0; it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that there exist
a single valued function ￿t+1 = ￿(yt;￿t;X); where the properties of the function are obtained noting the
properties of the function h(￿t￿yt) and FL(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1): Moreover, since ￿t+1 equalizes the marginal return
to labor in the two sectors; and since the marginal products of all factors of production are decreasing in
both sectors, ￿t+1 = argmaxyt+1. ￿




Proof. As established in Lemma 1, ￿t+1 = ￿(yt;￿t;X); and the corollary follows noting (3), (5), (16) and
(19). ￿
3.4 E¢ cient Expenditure on Public Education
This section demonstrates that the level of expenditure on public schooling (and hence the level of taxation)
that maximizes aggregate output is optimal from the viewpoint of all individuals except for landowners who
own a large fraction of the land in the economy.
Lemma 2 Let ￿￿





















(a) As follows from (15), (19), and Lemma 1, aggregate output in period t + 1; yt+1 is
yt+1 = y(yt;￿t;X) = yM(yt;￿t;￿(yt;￿t;X)) + yA(￿(yt;￿t;X);X): (22)









t = argmaxyt+1 then @yM(yt;￿￿
t;￿t+1)=@￿t = 0, and thus as follows from (15),














and the proof follows, noting that ￿k
￿￿1
t+1 ￿ R(kt+1) and (1 ￿ ￿)k￿
t+1 ￿ wM(kt+1).











t￿yt) ￿ 1 for all ￿￿
t￿yt ￿ 0 and limet!0+ h0(et) = 1; it follows that ￿￿
t = ￿￿(yt) 2 (0;1)
for all yt > 0: The uniqueness of ￿￿
t follows from the properties of the function h(￿￿
t￿yt). Furthermore,
￿￿(yt)yt is increasing in yt: Suppose not. Suppose that ￿￿(yt)yt is decreasing in yt: It follows that ￿￿ is
strictly decreasing in yt and therefore the left hand side of (26) is strictly increasing in yt whereas the right
hand side is decreasing. A contradiction.
(c) As derived in part (a), since ￿￿
t = argmaxyt+1; it follows from the envelope theorem that
￿￿
t = argmaxyM(yt;￿t;￿(yt;￿t;X)) = argmax[(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt]￿[h(￿t￿yt)]1￿￿￿
1￿￿
t+1 : (27)
(d) Follows from part (c) noting that, as follows from (17), (1 ￿ ￿t)Rt+1 = ￿yM
t+1=(￿yt):
(e) As follows from part (c)
￿￿
t = argmax[(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt]￿[h(￿t￿yt)]1￿￿￿
1￿￿
t+1 ; (28)
and therefore for any ￿t+1,
￿￿
t = argmax[(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt]￿[h(￿t￿yt)]1￿￿: (29)
Moreover, since
￿t+1 = ￿(yt;￿t;X)
= argmaxyt+1 = argmax[(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt]￿[h(￿t￿yt)]1￿￿￿
1￿￿
t+1 + F(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1);
(30)
it is strictly increasing in [(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt]￿[h(￿t￿yt)]1￿￿; and therefore ￿￿
t = argmax￿(yt;￿t;X):
(f) As follows from (3) and (20),
wt+1 = FL(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1); (31)
and therefore since wt+1 is monotonically increasing in ￿t+1 it follows from part (e) that ￿￿
t = argmaxwt+1:
(g) Follows from part (f) noting that along the factor price frontier ￿t decreases in wA
t and therefore in wt:￿
As established in Lemma 2 the value of ￿￿
t is independent of the size of land, X. The size of land
has two opposing e⁄ects on ￿￿
t that cancel one another due to the Cobb-Douglass production function in
10the manufacturing sector. Since a larger land size implies that employment in the manufacturing sector is
lower, the fraction of the labor force whose productivity is improved due to taxation that is designed to
￿nance universal public education is lower. In contrast, the return to each unit of human capital employed
in the manufacturing sector is higher while the return to physical capital is lower, since human capital in
the manufacturing sector is scarce.
Furthermore, since the tax rate is linear and the elasticity of substitution between human and physical
capital in the manufacturing sector is unitary, as established in Lemma 2, the tax rate that maximizes
aggregate output in period t + 1 also maximizes the wage per worker, wt+1; and the net return to capital,
(1 ￿ ￿￿
t)Rt+1. Hence, there is no con￿ ict of interest among individual that do not own land regarding the
optimal education policy.24 Moreover, given the factor price frontier, since ￿￿
t maximizes the wage per
worker, wt+1; it minimizes the rent on land, ￿t+1:
As follows from Lemma 2, the desirable tax policy from the viewpoint of individual i depends on
the income that the individual derives from land holding, xi￿t+1; relative to the income that the individual
generates from capital holding and wages, wt+1+bi
t(1￿￿t)Rt+1: In particular, as established in the following
proposition, individuals whose land income is su¢ ciently small relative to their capital and wage income
would support the e¢ cient tax policy.
Proposition 1 Given (bi
t;yt;X), there exists a su¢ ciently low level of land holding by individual i, ^ xi
t, such
that the desirable level of taxation from the viewpoint of individual i is the level of taxation that maximizes
output per capita, ￿￿
t: ^ xi
t is inversely related to the level of bi
t:
Proof. Since the indirect utility function is a strictly increasing function of the individual￿ s second
period wealth, Ii




t(1￿￿t)R(yt;￿t;X)+xi￿(yt;￿t;X): As established in Lemma 2, w(yt;￿t;X)+
bi
t(1￿￿t)R(yt;￿t;X) is maximized at an interior level ￿￿
t; and xi￿(yt;￿t;X) is minimized by the same interior
level ￿￿
t: Hence, for all xi; ￿￿
t is the extremum of Ii(yt;￿t;bi
t;xi;X) and thus @Ii(yt;￿￿
t;bi
t;xi;X)=@￿t = 0.
In particular for xi = 0; ￿￿
t is a global maximum of Ii(yt;￿t;bi
t;xi;X). Thus, it follows from continuity
that there exists ^ xi
t > 0 such that for all xi 2 (0; ^ xi
t); the extremum, ￿￿
t; remains a global maximum of
Ii(yt;￿t;bi
t;xi;X). Since @￿(yt;￿t;bi
t;xi;X)=@￿t < 1; it follows from the continuity of Ii(yt;￿￿
t;bi
t;xi;X) in
xi that there exists a su¢ ciently low level of xi; ^ xi
t; such that ￿￿
t = argmaxIi
t+1 for all xi ￿ ^ xi
t (i.e., there
exists a su¢ ciently low xi such that ￿￿
t maximizes Ii
t+1 globally), where ^ xi
t is inversely related to the levels
of bi
t.
3.5 The Class Structure
Suppose that in period 0 the economy consists of three homogeneous groups of individuals in the ￿rst period
of their lives ￿Landowners, Capitalists and Workers. They are identical in their preferences and di⁄er only
in their initial wealth and landownership. Landowners are a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of all individuals in society
who equally share the entire stock of land in the economy, X: Since landowners are homogeneous in period 0
24The absence of disagreement between the Capitalists and Workers about the optimal tax policy would hold as long as the
production function is Cobb-Douglas. However, even if the elasticity of substitution would be di⁄erent than one, in contrast to
land owners, both groups would support public education although they would di⁄er in their desirable tax rates. If the elasticity
is larger than unity but ￿nite, then the tax rate that maximizes the wage per worker would have been larger than the optimal
tax rate and the tax rate that maximizes the return to capital would have been lower, yet strictly positive. If the elasticity of
substitution is smaller than unity, the opposite holds.
11and since land is bequeathed from parent to child and each individual has a single child and a single parent,
it follows that the distribution of land ownership in society is constant over time, where each landlord owns
X=￿ units of land. Capitalists are a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of all individuals in society who equally share the
entire initial stock of physical capital.25 Finally, Workers are a fraction 1￿￿￿￿ 2 (0;1) of all individuals in
society. They are landless and they do not own physical capital. Since individuals are initially homogenous
within a group, the uniqueness of the solution to their optimization problem assures that their o⁄spring are
homogenous as well. Hence, in every period a fraction ￿ of all adults are homogenous descendants of the
Capitalists, a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ are homogenous descendants of Workers, and a fraction ￿ are landowners.
As the economy develops, members of all segments of society accumulate physical capital.
3.6 Political Mechanism
In light of our interest in the e⁄ect of economic rather than political transitions on education reforms and
economic growth, the political structure of the economy is designed as a stationary structure that is una⁄ected
by economic development. In particular, we deliberately impose a crude political mechanism under which
education reforms require the consent of the class of Landowners. Although economic development does
not a⁄ect this political structure, it changes the economic incentives confronted by landowners and thereby
a⁄ects their attitude towards educations reforms.
Clearly, even in democracies, the median voting model is not perfectly applicable. Strong interest
groups, such as landowners, exert a larger in￿ uence on public policy relative to their representation in the
population. For the sake of simplicity we adopt an extreme modeling approach that provides landowners as a
group with a veto power against education reforms. The adoption of some alternative approaches, such as a
lobbing model, or probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), would not change the qualitative
results. Moreover, in order to focus on the con￿ ict between Landowners and the remaining segments of
the economy, we abstract from a potential con￿ ict of interest among landowners, assuming land is equally
distributed across landowners, and coordination among landowners is therefore not essential.26
Suppose, in particular, that changes in the existing educational policy require the consent of all
segments of society.27 In the absence of consensus the existing educational policy remains intact. Suppose
further that consistently with the historical experience, societies initially do not ￿nance education (i.e.,
￿0 = 0): It follows that unless all segments of society would ￿nd it bene￿cial to alter the existing educational
policy, the tax rate will remain zero. Once all segments of society ￿nd it bene￿cial to implement educational
policy that maximizes aggregate output, this policy would remain in e⁄ect unless all segments of society
25Heterogeneity in capital holdings across Capitalists will not a⁄ect the analysis since as established in the discussion that
follows Lemma 2, there is no con￿ict of interest among the landless. Furthermore, if each landowner, as well, owns an equal
stock of capital in the ￿rst period, the qualitative analysis will not be a⁄ected.
26The introduction of inequality in landholdings across landowners would not a⁄ect the qualitative results. It would have an
ambiguous e⁄ect on the timing of education reforms. Large landowners that would be expected to su⁄er a larger loss in rental
rents due to education reforms, would be engaged in more intense lobbying activity to block these reforms, but their force will
be diminished due to their smaller representation within the group of landowners.
27For simplicity, it is assumed that the decision on the desirable tax rate is taken by the young generation. A more natural
assumption would be to permit the parental generation to choose the desirable level of taxation and thus the resources that
would be devoted to the education of their children. A departure from warm glow utility would achieve this goal at the cost of
signi￿cant complications. In particular, if individuals￿utility is de￿ned over their o⁄spring￿ s income, parents would choose the
desirable tax rate from the viewpoint of the child. This departure would maintain the crucial feature of a monotonic relationship
between bequest and income, but since the total size of transfer will not necessarily be a constant fraction of wealth it would
complicate the analysis unnecessarily. Similarly, the choice of an income tax rather than bequest tax would complicate the
analysis. As long as the parental generation chooses the tax rate on their income, individuals would optimally allocate their
income between their own consumption, transfer to their o⁄spring, and ￿nance of public education. Hence as long as individuals
take the tax structure into account when deciding how much to bequest, it would not a⁄ect the result qualitatively.
12would support an alternative policy. Since the landless (i.e., workers and capitalists) are uni￿ed in their
support for an e¢ cient level of taxation in every time period, the consent of the landowners is the pivotal
force in the implementation of the output maximizing education level.28
3.7 Landowners￿Desirable Schooling Policy
The income of each landowner in the second period of life, IL
t+1; as follows from (8) and Corollary 1, is
therefore
IL
t+1 = w(yt;￿t;X) + (1 ￿ ￿t)R(yt;￿t;X)bL
t + ￿(yt;￿t;X)X=￿; (32)
and bL
t+1, as follows from (10) is therefore
bL
t+1 = ￿[w(yt;￿t;X) + (1 ￿ ￿t)R(yt;￿t;X)bL
t + ￿(yt;￿t;X)X=￿] ￿ bL(yt;bL
t ;￿t;X;￿): (33)
As summarized in the following Lemma, the economy advances and the share of land in aggregate
output gradually declines, the stake of landowners in other sectors gradually increases, due to their labor
and capital holdings, and their objection to education reforms therefore declines over time.29
Proposition 2 In the absence of taxation in the initial period, i.e., ￿0 = 0; given the political mechanism,
(a) There exists a critical level of the aggregate capital inheritance of all landowner, ^ BL
t ; where BL
t = ￿bL
t ;
above which their income under the e¢ cient tax policy ￿￿
t is higher than under ￿t = 0; and the economy
switches to ￿￿










(b) The critical level of capital holdings, ^ BL
t ; above which the e¢ cient tax policy is chosen,
(i) increases with the degree of land inequality in the economy, i.e.,
@ ^ BL(yt;X;￿)=@￿ < 0;
(ii) is zero for a su¢ ciently low level of land inequality (i.e. for a su¢ ciently large ￿). In particular,
lim￿!1 ^ BL(yt;X;￿) ￿ 0:
(iii) is zero for a su¢ ciently large level of income per capita. In particular,
limyt!1 ^ BL(yt;X;￿) ￿ 0:
28Landowners, as well as other owners of factors of production, in￿uence the level of public schooling but are limited in their
power to levy taxes for their own bene￿t. Otherwise, following the Coasian Theorem, the landed elite would prefer an optimal
level of education, taxing the resulting increase in aggregate income.
29The proposed theory relies on the diminishing importance of land rents for the income of the economy over time, in
accordance with the long run trend in developed countries. For the United Kingdom, Lindert (1986) documents that the share
of land rent in national income in 1867 was 5%, falling to less than 0.5% in 1972-73. A similar pattern is found for the United
States, where in 1900 the share of national income going to rent was 9.1%, by 1930 was 6.6%, and by 2005 was 0.7%. (The
1900 ￿gure is from the U.S. Historical Statistics, series F186-191. The 1930 and 2005 ￿gures are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.) If land is used only in the agricultural sector, the decline in its rental rate in the process of development, to a level
below a positive threshold, assures that landowners would ultimately support education reforms. If land is also used in the
manufacturing sector, the results will not be a⁄ected qualitatively, as long as the share of land that is employed in the industrial
sector is initially small. The rise in the rental rate on industrial land in the process of urbanization and its impact on the rise on
the rental rate of land in the economy as a whole, would just accelerate the transition, since it will increase landowners bene￿ts
from the process of industrialization.
13(c) Let ^ t be the ￿rst period in which the e¢ cient tax policy, ￿t = ￿￿
t; is implemented. The e¢ cient tax policy
will remain in place thereafter, i.e.,
￿t = ￿￿
t 8t ￿ ^ t:
Proof.
(a) Noting that landlords are identical and their number is unchanged in the process of development, the tax
policy that maximizes income of all landowners also maximizes the income of each landowner. As follows
from (32), ^ BL
t+1 = ^ BL(yt;X;￿) is the level of BL
t = ￿bL
t that equates the income of landowners in the case
were ￿t = 0 and ￿t = ￿￿
t: ^ BL
t+1 exists since as established in Lemma 2 ￿￿
t = argmax(1 ￿ ￿t)Rt+1 and thus
(1 ￿ ￿￿
t)R(yt;￿￿
t;X) ￿ R(yt;0;X) > 0:
(b) (i) Follows directly from the derivation of ^ b(yt;X;￿); with respect to ￿; noting that for a given yt; ￿ has
no e⁄ect on prices and that for yt > 0; ￿￿
t = argmaxwt+1 > 0; and therefore [w(yt;0;X) ￿ w(yt;￿￿
t;X)] < 0.
(b) (ii) Since the agriculture production function (2) is CRS, it follows that the aggregate return to land is
X￿t+1 = F(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1) ￿ wt+1(1 ￿ ￿t+1): (34)
Hence, landlord￿ s income, ￿Ii
t+1 = ￿wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)Rt+1BL
t + X￿t+1; is
￿IL
t+1 = w(yt;￿t;X)[￿ + ￿t+1 ￿ 1] + (1 ￿ ￿t)R(yt;￿t;X)BL
t + F(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1): (35)
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> 0 for ￿ < ￿￿
t
= 0 for ￿ = ￿￿
t
< 0 for ￿ > ￿￿
t;
(37)
and therefore for a su¢ ciently large ￿ the threshold is zero, i.e., lim￿!1 ^ BL(yt;X;￿) ￿ 0:
(b) (iii) As follows from Lemma 1; as yt ! 1; ￿t+1 ! 1 and therefore it follows from (36) that for any
BL
t ￿ 0; (37) holds and hence limyt!1 ^ BL(yt;X;￿) ￿ 0:
(c) As established in Proposition 1, the desirable tax policy from the viewpoint of landless (i.e., Workers
and Capitalists) is ￿￿
t: Hence, given that the political mechanism requires a consensus for changes in the tax
policy, once the chosen tax rate is ￿￿
t it will remain so thereafter.30 ￿
Remark. There exists a range of agricultural production functions such that the desirable level of
taxation from the viewpoint of landowners, ￿L
t ; are ￿t = 0 or ￿t = ￿￿
t; in the range ￿L
t 2 [0;￿￿
t]:31 It should
30It should be noted that, in fact, landowners optimal tax rate will remain ￿￿
t thereafter, since education reforms would
further increase the stake of landowners in the non-agricultural part of the economy.
31In particular, the preferred tax rate from the viewpoint of landowners will be ￿t = 0 or ￿t = ￿￿
t when the elasticity
of substitution between labor and land is 0 or 1: (i) If the production function is Cobb-Douglas F(X;Lt) = AX￿L
1￿￿
t ; as
established in Appendix 1, landowners would prefer either ￿t = 0 or ￿t = ￿￿
t over any ￿t 2 (0;￿￿
t): (ii) If land and labor are
perfect complements, as established in Proposition 5, as long as the wage rate is below the threshold level above which the
demand for workers in agriculture is zero, landowners prefer the lowest level of industrial output, yM
t ; and hence ￿t = 0: As
the economy develops and the wage rate crosses this threshold, their preferred tax rate is ￿￿
t since the return to land is zero
anyway.
14be noted that given the political mechanism, and the absence of taxation in period 0, even if the desirable
level of taxation from the viewpoint of a landowner, ￿L
t ; is any level in the interval (0;￿￿
t); the tax rate that
prevails in the economy in every period t is either 0 or ￿￿
t: Under a di⁄erent political structures the transition
from a zero tax rate to ￿￿
t could be a gradual process. The process of development will induce landowners
to compromise (or support) increasingly higher levels of taxation and the qualitative results regarding the
adverse e⁄ect of land inequality on the implementation of education reforms would remain intact.
4 The Process of Development
This section analyzes the evolution of an economy from an agricultural to an industrial-based economy. It
demonstrates that the gradual decline in the importance of the agricultural sector along with an increase in
the capital holdings in landlords￿portfolio may alter the attitude of landlords towards educational reforms.
In societies in which land is scarce or its ownership is distributed rather equally, the process of development
allows the implementation of an optimal education policy, and the economy experiences a signi￿cant invest-
ment in human capital and a rapid process of development. In contrast, in societies where land is abundant
and its distribution is unequal, an ine¢ cient education policy will persist and the economy will experience
a lower growth path as well as a lower level of output in the long-run. Thus, land reforms that su¢ ciently
reduce inequality in landownership permit an earlier implementation of an e¢ cient education policy.






0(yt) ￿ (￿yt)￿￿(yt;0;X)1￿￿ + F(X;1 ￿ ￿(yt;0;X)) for ￿t = 0;
 
￿(yt) ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿￿
t)￿yt)￿[￿(yt;￿￿
t;X)h(￿￿
t￿yt))1￿￿ + F(X;1 ￿ ￿(yt;￿￿




￿(yt) >  
0(yt) for yt > 0:
d 
j(yt)=dyt > 0; d2 
j(yt)=dy2
t < 0;  
j(0) = F(X;1) > 0; d 
j(yt)=dX > 0, and
limyt!1d 
j(yt)=dyt = 0; j = 0;￿:
Proof. As follows from (1), (15) and (19), yt+1 = yA
t+1 + yM
t+1 = [(1 ￿ ￿t)￿yt)￿[￿t+1h(￿t￿yt))1￿￿ +
F(X;1 ￿ ￿t+1): Thus, noting that, h(0) = 1 the evolution of yt+1 as stated in the proposition is obtained.
Since ￿￿
t = argmaxyt+1 and ￿￿
t > 0; it follows that  
￿(yt) >  
0(yt) for yt > 0: As follows from Lemma 1 and
Proposition 2, the properties of the functions  
￿(yt) and  
0(yt) follows, noting that ￿t+1 = argmaxyt+1;
￿￿
t = argmaxyt+1 and applying the envelop theorem. ￿
Note that the evolution of output per capita, for a given schooling policy, is independent of the
distribution of land and income.
Corollary 2 Given the size of land, X; there exists a unique ￿ y0 and a unique ￿ y￿ such that
￿ y0 =  
0(￿ y0);
￿ y￿ =  
￿(￿ y￿);
where ￿ y￿ > ￿ y0:
15Proof. Follows from the properties of  
￿(yt) and  
0(yt); as established in Proposition 3. ￿







0(yt) for t < ^ t
 
￿(yt) for t ￿ ^ t:
Hence, the economy evolves on the lower trajectory dictated by  
0(yt) till time ^ t (e.g., where the level
of income is ^ y ￿ y^ t) and then moves to a higher trajectory that is governed by  
￿(yt):
1 + t y
t y * y








Figure 1. The evolution of income per capita before and after the implementation
of education reforms
Proposition 4 For a given set of initial conditions, (i.e., y0; k0; X; h0 = 1, BL
0 = ￿￿IL
0 < ^ BL(y0;X;￿)
and therefore ￿0 = 0), a less equal land distribution, (i.e., a low level of ￿); will generate a delay in the
implementation of an e¢ cient education policy and will therefore result in an inferior growth path. That is,
a less equal distribution of land ownership implies that the timing of the implementation of the e¢ cient tax
policy, ^ t; is delayed.
Proof. As follows from (33), noting that BL
t+1 = ￿bL
t+1 = ￿￿IL
t+1; the evolution of aggregate capital holdings








As established in Proposition 3, as long as ￿t = 0, the evolution of income per capita, yt; is independent of
￿: Hence it follows from Corollary 1 that factor prices are independent of ￿ and therefore, as follows from
(38), BL
t is increasing in ￿. Hence, noting that as established in Proposition 2 ^ BL(yt;X;￿) is decreasing
with ￿; the lower is ￿ the larger is ^ t (i.e., the later is the time period in which BL
t > ^ BL
t ):
Proposition 5 (Persistence of Ine¢ cient Education Policy) If the productivity in the manufacturing sector
is limited, and the degree of complementarity between land and labor is su¢ ciently high, then there exists a
su¢ ciently high level of land inequality (i.e., a su¢ ciently low ￿); such that ine¢ cient education policy will
persist inde￿nitely (i.e., ^ t ! 1):
16Proof. Suppose that the production function in the agriculture sector is yA
t = F(X;Lt) = minfX;Ltg;
where, X < 1 (i.e., X is smaller than the size of the working population) to assure that some workers are
employed in the industrial sector. Hence, for wt < 1; X = Lt = 1 ￿ ￿t: As follows from (18) and (20),
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)yM
t =￿t: Therefore, for wt < 1;













￿t = 1 ￿ yM
t :
Hence, if for yM
t < 1; the income of all landowners, noting (17), is
￿IL
t = ￿wt + ￿tX + sL
t ￿yM




t is the share of landowners in the total capital stock. Since sL
t < 1; it follows that for a su¢ ciently
low ￿ landowners￿income is decreasing with yM
t ; as long as yM
t < 1: Hence, since ￿ y0 <  
￿(￿ y0); then if
 
￿(￿ y0) < 1 landowners prefer ￿t = 0; rather than ￿t = ￿￿
t when yt = ￿ y0: ￿
Corollary 3 (Land Reforms and Education Policy) A land reform that reduces su¢ ciently the concentration
of land ownership in the economy (i.e., a su¢ cient increase in ￿) would expedite the implementation of
e¢ cient education policy.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 4. ￿
Hence, consistent with historical anecdotes presented in the next section, land reforms would be
expected to follow by education reforms.
Under the conditions speci￿ed in Proposition 5 there exists a steady state equilibrium in which an
ine¢ cient education policy exists. In particular, as depicted in Figure 2, country A reaches a steady-state
equilibrium at a level of income per-capita
￿
￿ y0￿A
; prior to the implementation of education reforms that
would have occurred if the level of income per capita in the economy would have reached ^ yA.
Thus, among countries where land inequality is higher, (i.e., ￿ is smaller) a poverty trap, in which
ine¢ cient education policy persists may emerge. In particular, a country could reach the low income steady
state ￿ y0 before reaching the point in which BL
t is su¢ ciently large to bring about a policy shift. In contrast,
for su¢ ciently equal economies, ^ t is necessarily ￿nite. In particular if land ownership is equally distributed
across members of society (i.e., if ￿ = 1); then as established in Proposition 2, the e¢ cient tax policy is
implemented in period 0:
Hence, the distribution of land within and across countries a⁄ected the nature of the transition from
an agrarian to an industrial economy, generating diverging growth patterns across countries. Furthermore,
land abundance that was bene￿cial in early stages of development, brought about a hurdle for human capital
accumulation and economic growth among countries that were marked by an unequal distribution of land
ownership. As depicted in Figure 2, some land abundant countries which were associated with the club of
the rich economies in the pre-industrial revolution era and were characterized by an unequal distribution of
land, were overtaken in the process of industrialization by land scarce countries. The qualitative change in
17the role of land in the process of industrialization has brought about changes in the ranking of countries in
the world income distribution.32
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Figure 2. Overtaking. Country A is relatively richer in land, however, due to land inequality
it fails to implement e¢ cient schooling and is overtaken by country B.
In the process of development, as long as the economy implements an e¢ cient education policy,
inequality subsides over time. In particular, inequality between Workers and Capitalists asymptotically
disappear, whereas inequality between landowners and the landless subsides, due to the decline in the return
to land. If the economy remains in a poverty trap, however, inequality between landowners and landless will
not converge while inequality between Workers and Capitalists will asymptotically disappear.33
Land inequality and wealth inequality may have a very di⁄erent e⁄ect on education reforms. While
inequality in land ownership delays education reforms, inequality in the distribution of capital among the
landless has no e⁄ect on the timing of education reforms, whereas a larger concentration of capital held by
the landowners would expedite the implementation of education reforms.
5 Historical Evidence
Historical evidence suggests that indeed the distribution of land ownership has been a signi￿cant force in
the emergence of sustained di⁄erences in human capital formation and growth patterns across countries.
5.1 Land Ownership and the Level of Education
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the degree of concentration of land ownership across countries and regions
is inversely related to education expenditure and attainment. North and South America provide the most
32If the utility of individuals is de￿ned over the discounted stream of utilities of their o⁄spring, the qualitative results will
not be a⁄ected. An earlier implementation of education reforms would raise the income of future members of a landowner￿ s
dynasty on the account of the contemporary income of the landowner. The optimal timing of the implementation of education
reforms from the viewpoint of each landowner would depend, therefore, on the discount factor applied for future members of the
dynasty. It would occur earlier than in the case in which individuals do not generate utility from the utility of their o⁄spring,
but would be still a⁄ected adversely by the degree of land inequality, since it determines the relative stake of landowners in
other segments of the economy. In particular, if ￿ y￿ < 1; in the context of Proposition 5, there exists a su¢ ciently high level
of land inequality such that ine¢ cient education policy will persist inde￿nitely (i.e., landowners would not ￿nd it bene￿cial to
implement education reforms in any time period). In this case, regardless of the discount factor applied to o⁄spring the timing
of education reforms will not be a⁄ected at all (i.e., ^ t ! 1):
33The distinction between workers and capitalists fades in the limit due to the simplifying structure of homothetic preferences.
If preferences are non-homothetic, as in Galor and Moav, 2006, inequality in the distribution of land ownership, that would
delay the implementation of e¢ cient schooling would slow down this convergence process.
18distinctive set of suggestive evidence about the relationship between the distribution of land ownership,
education reforms, and the process of development. The original colonies in North and South America had
a vast amount of land per person and levels of income per capita that were comparable to the Western
European ones. North and Latin America, however, di⁄ered in the distribution of land and resources.
While the United States and Canada have been characterized by a relatively egalitarian distribution of land
ownership, in the rest of the new world land and resources have been persistently concentrated in the hand
of the elite (Deininger and Squire, 1998).
Consistent with the proposed theory, persistent di⁄erences in the distribution of land ownership
between North and Latin America were associated with signi￿cant divergence in education and income
levels across these regions (Maddison, 2001). Although all of the economies in the western hemisphere were
developed enough in the early 19th century to justify investment in primary schools, only the United States
and Canada were engaged in the education of the general population (Coatsworth, 1993, and Engerman and
Sokolo⁄, 2000).34
Variations in the degree of inequality in the distribution of land ownership among Latin American
countries were re￿ ected in variation in investment in human capital as well. In particular, Argentina, Chile
and Uruguay, in which inequality in the distribution of land ownership was less pronounced, invested sig-
ni￿cantly more in education (Engerman and Sokolo⁄, 2000). Similarly, Nugent and Robinson (2002) show
that in Costa Rica and Colombia where co⁄ee is typically grown in small farms (re￿ ecting lower inequality
in the distribution of land) income and human capital are signi￿cantly higher than that of Guatemala and
El Salvador, where co⁄ee plantations are rather large.35 Moreover, one of the principles championed by the
progressives during the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was compulsory, free public education. However, the
achievement of this goal varied greatly by state. In the north, with a relatively more equitable land distrib-
ution, enrollment in public schools increased rapidly as industrialization advanced following the revolution.
This is in contrast to the southern states, which were dominated by the haciendas who employed essentially
slave labor. In these states there was virtually no increase in school enrollment following the revolution
(Vaughan, 1982). Similarly, rural education in Brazil lagged due to the immense political power of the local
landlords. Hence, in 1950, thirty years after the Brazilian government had instituted an education reform,
nearly 75% of the nation was still illiterate (Bonilla, 1965).
5.2 Land Reforms and Education Reforms
Evidence from Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan indicates that land reforms were followed by, or occurred
simultaneously with, signi￿cant education reforms. There are two interpretations for those historical episodes.
First, as proposed explicitly by the theory, land reforms may diminish the economic incentives of landowners
to block education reforms. Second, a non-favorable shift in the balance of power from the viewpoint of the
landed aristocracy brought about the implementation of both land and education reforms, consistently with
the basic premise that landowners opposed education spending whereas others (e.g., the industrial elite)
favored it.
34One may view the civil war in the US as a struggle between the industrialists in the north who were striving for a large
supply of (educated) workers, and the landowners in the south that wanted to sustained the existing system and to assure the
existence of a large supply of cheap (uneducated) labor.
35In contrast to the proposed theory, Nugent and Robinson (2002) suggest that a holdup problem generated by the monopsony
power in large plantations prevents commitment to reward investment in human capital, whereas small holders can capture the
reward to human capital and have therefore the incentive to invest. This mechanism does not generate the economic forces that
permit the economy to escape this institutional trap.
195.2.1 Japan and the Meiji Restoration
Towards the end of Tokugawa regime (1600- 1867), although the level of education in Japan was impressive
for its time, the provision of education was sporadic and had no central control or funding, re￿ ecting partly
the resistance of the landholding military class for education reforms (Gubbins, 1973). The opportunity
to modernize the education system arrived with the overthrow of the traditional feudal structure shortly
after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In 1871, an Imperial Decree initiated the abolishment of the feudal
system. In a sequence of legislation in the period 1871-1883, decisions on land utilization and choice of crops
were transferred to farmers from their landlords, prohibitions on the sale and mortgage of farmland were
removed, a title of ownership was granted to the legal owners of the land, and communal pasture and forest
land was transferred from the ownership of wealthy landlords to the ownership of the central government.
This legislation resulted in the distribution of land holdings among small family farms, which persisted until
the rise of a new landlord system during the 1930￿ s (Hayami, 1975, chapter 3).
Education reform and land reform evolved simultaneously. In 1872 the Educational Code established
compulsory and locally funded education for all children between ages 6 and 14 (Gubbins, 1973, chapter
30). In addition, a secondary school and university system was funded by the central government. The
Education Code of 1872 was re￿ned in 1879 and 1886, setting the foundations for the structure of Japanese
education until World War II. The progress in education attainment following the land reforms of the Meiji
government was substantial. While in 1873 only 28% of school-age children attended schools, this ratio
increased to 51% by 1883 and to 94% by 1903 (Passin, 1965).
5.2.2 Russia before the Revolution
Education in Tsarist Russia lagged well behind comparable European countries at the close of the 19th cen-
tury. Provincial councils dominated by wealthier landowners were responsible for their local school systems
and were reluctant to favor education for the peasants (Johnson, 1969). Literacy rates in the rural areas were
a mere 21% in 1896, and the urban literacy rate was only 56%. As the Tsar￿ s grip on power weakened during
the early 1900￿ s the political power of the wealthy landowners gradually declined leading to a sequence of
agrarian reforms that were initiated by the premier Stolypin in 1906. Restrictions on mobility of peasants
were abolished, fragmented landholdings were consolidated, and the formation of individually owned farms
was encouraged and supported through the provision of government credit. Stolypin￿ s reforms accelerated
the redistribution of land to individual farmers and landholdings of the landed aristocracy declined from
about 35-45% in 1860 to 17% in 1917 (Florinsky, 1961).
Following the agrarian reforms and the declining in￿ uence of the landed aristocracy, the provision of
compulsory elementary education had been proposed. The initial e⁄ort of 1906 languished, but the newly
created representative Duma continued to pressure the government to provide free compulsory education. In
the period 1908-1912, the Duma approved a sequence of a signi￿cant increase in expenditures for education
(Johnson, 1969). The share of the Provincial council￿ s budget that was allocated to education increased from
20.4% in 1905 to 31.1% in 1914 (Johnson, 1969), the share of the central government￿ s budget that was
devoted to the Ministry of Public Education increased three-fold from 1.4% in 1906 to 4.9% in 1915, and
the share of the entire population that was actively attending schools increased 3-fold from 1.7% in 1897 to
5.7% in 1915 (Dennis, 1961).
205.2.3 South Korea and Taiwan
The process of development in Korea was marked by a major land reform followed by a massive increase
in governmental expenditure on education. During the Japanese occupation in the period 1905-1945, land
distribution in Korea became increasingly skewed and in 1945 nearly 70% of Korean farming households were
simply tenants (Eckert, 1990). In 1948-1950, the Republic of Korea instituted the Agricultural Land Reform
Amendment Act that drastically a⁄ected landholdings.36 The principle of land reform was enshrined in the
constitution of 1948 and the actual implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act began
on March 10th, 1950.37 This act prohibited tenancy and land renting, put a maximum on the amount of land
any individual could own, and dictated that an individual could only own land if they actually cultivated
it. Owner cultivated farm households increased 6-fold from 349,000 in 1949 to 1,812,000 in 1950, and tenant
farm households declined from 1,133,000 in 1949 to essentially zero in 1950. (Yoong-Deok and Kim, 2000).
Land reforms were accompanied by soaring expenditure on education. In 1949, a new Education Law
was passed within South Korea that focused speci￿cally on transforming the population into a technically
competent workforce capable of industrial work. This led to dramatic increases in the number of schools
and students at all levels of education. Between 1945 and 1960 the number of elementary schools increased
by 60% and the number of elementary students went up by a staggering 165%. In secondary education the
growth is even more dramatic, with both the number of schools and the number of students growing by a
factor of ten in the same time period. The number of higher education institutions quadrupled and the
number of higher education students increased from only 7,000 in 1945 to over 100,000 in 1960. In 1948,
Korea allocated 8% of government expenditures to education. Following a slight decline due to the Korean
war, educational expenditure has increased to 9.2% in 1957 and 14.9% in 1960, remaining at about 15%
thereafter (Sah-Myung, 1983).
Taiwan experienced a similar path over the same period once the Japanese colonization ended. The
government of Taiwan implemented a land reform in the time period 1949-1953. It enforced rent reductions,
it sold public land to individual farmers who had previously been tenants, and permitted the purchase of
rented land. In 1948, prior to the land reform, 57% of farm families were full or part owners, 43% were
tenants or hired hands. By 1959 the share of full or part owners had increased to 81%, and the share of
tenants or hired-hands dropped to 19% (Cheng, 1961).
A massive educational reform accompanied these land reforms. The number of schools in Taiwan
grew by 5% per year between 1950 and 1970, while the number of students grew by 6% a year. The pattern
of growth mirrors that of South Korea, with especially impressive growth of 11% per year in the number
of secondary students, and a 16% per year in higher education students. Funding for education grew from
1.78% of GNP in 1951 to 4.12% in 1970 (Lin, 1983).
In 1950 South Korea and Taiwan were primarily agricultural economies with a GDP per capita
(measured in 1990 international dollars of $770 and $936, respectively. South Korea and Taiwan lagged in
GDP per capita well behind many countries within Latin America, such as Colombia ($2153) and Mexico
($2365), sharing with these countries a legacy of vast inequality in the distribution of agricultural land. In
contrast to the Latin American countries, the implementation of land reforms in South Korea and Taiwan
36A major force behind this land reform was the aim of the U.S. provisional government after WWII to remove the in￿uence
of the large landowners (who were either Japanese or collaborators with the Japanese).
37Formally the education reform took place prior to the land reforms, but the provision for land reform was enshrined in
the constitution prior to the educational reform. The imminent land reform could have reduced the incentives for the landed
aristocracy to oppose this education reform.
21and its apparent e⁄ect on education reforms a⁄ected their growth trajectory signi￿cantly, leading them to
one of the most successful economic growth stories of the post-war period. From a level of income per capita
in 1950 that placed them not only far behind the nations of Latin America but also behind Congo, Liberia,
and Mozambique, these two countries have each grown at an average rate of nearly 6% per year between 1950
and 1998, leaving behind the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and overtaking the Latin American countries
in this period. In 1998 South Korea and Taiwan had GDP per capita levels 150% higher than Colombia
and 100% higher than Mexico (Maddison, 2001).
6 Evidence from the US High School Movement
The central hypothesis of this research, that land inequality adversely a⁄ected the timing of education
reforms, is examined empirically using variations in public spending on education across states and over time
in the US during the high school movement. Historical evidence from the US on education expenditures
and land ownership in the period 1880-1940 suggests that land inequality had a signi￿cant adverse e⁄ect on
educational expenditures during this period.38
During the ￿rst half of the 20th century the education system in the US underwent a major trans-
formation from insigni￿cant to nearly universal secondary education. As established by Goldin (1998), in
1910 high school graduation rates were between 9-15% in the Northeast and the Paci￿c regions and only
about 4% in the South. By 1950 graduation rates were nearly 60% in the Northeast and the Paci￿c regions
and about 40% in the South. Furthermore, Goldin and Katz (1997) document signi￿cant variations in the
timing of these changes and their extensiveness across regions.
The high school movement and its qualitative e⁄ect on the structure of education in the US re￿ ected
an educational shift towards non-agricultural learning that is at the heart of the proposed hypothesis. The
high school movement was undertaken with the intention of building a skilled work-force that could better
serve the manufacturing sector. Over this period, ￿rms increasingly demanded skilled workers that could
be e⁄ective managers, sales personnel, and clerical workers, and courses in accounting, typing, shorthand,
and algebra were highly valued in the white-collar occupations. In addition, in the 1910s, some of the
high-technology industries of the period started to demand blue-collar craft workers who were trained in
mathematics, chemistry, and electricity (Goldin, 1999).
The proposed theory suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership was signi￿cant in
determining the pace of education reforms across the U.S. We exploit di⁄erences in education expenditures
across states over the period 1900-1940 to identify the role of the land inequality on education expenditures,
controlling for the level of income per capita, the percentage of the black population, and the urbanization
rate within each state.39
38For other studies of the relationship between land and economic performance in the US over this time period see Gerber
(1991) and Coleman and Caselli (2001).
39Consistently with the proposed theory and the empirical ￿ndings, Wright (1986) suggests that Southern governments,
in￿uenced heavily by landholders, refused to expand enrollments and spending in education because the North which provided
a signi￿cant outside option for educated workers would reap the bene￿ts from it.
226.1 Data
The level of expenditure per child within each state in the time period 1900-1940 is computed, utilizing data
on the number of children in the state in each of the relevant years from the relevant U.S. Census.40 These
expenditures are converted to 1920 dollars to match the income per capita estimates used.41
Education expenditure varied greatly over this period. For example, in 1900 the state of Alabama
was spending $3.16 (in 1920 dollars) per child on education. In contrast, Massachusetts had expenditures
of $44.57 per child, a fourteen-fold di⁄erence. By 1920, Alabama had expenditures of $11.78 per child,
while spending per child in Massachusetts had increased to $45.09, only four times greater than Alabama￿ s
spending. In 1940, the gap had narrowed to less than a factor of three, $35.61 for Alabama and $102.87 for
Massachusetts.
The degree of inequality in the distribution of landownership is captured in a consistent fashion with
the structure of the model by the share of land held by large landowners. In particular, based on U.S. Census
data, we trace the evolution of the share of land holdings by the minimal number of farms that constitute
20% of agricultural land in 1880 within each state, as outlined in Appendix 3. For subsequent years, 1900
and 1920, the share of land held by this same number of the largest farms is measured. To illustrate the
methodology, in Wisconsin in 1880 the largest 15,145 farms (11% of total farms) held 20% of the farmland.
In 1900, the largest 15,145 farms held 16% of the land, declining to 12% in 1920. The qualitative results
are not a⁄ected if we use alternatively as a benchmark the share of land holdings by the minimal number of
farms that held 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% or 80% of the land in 1880.
The evolution of land concentration across regions in the U.S. (as de￿ned in Appendix 3) exhibits the
following patterns. For states in the Northeast, the average share rose from 20% in 1880 to 22% in 1900
and 24% in 1920. Southern states experienced a decline in the average share of land held by the largest
farms from 20% in 1880 to 12% in 1900 and to only 8% by 1920. This decline in the share of land held by
large farmers is mimicked in the West, where the share drops to 9% in 1900 and to 6% in 1920. Similarly,
the Midwest experienced a decline from 20% in 1880 to 16% in 1900 to 13% in 1920.
Several other controls are included in the speci￿cations. Variation in income per capita across states
that would be expected to a⁄ect the variation in education expenditures. The percentage of the black
population to ensure that the adverse e⁄ect of inequality in the distribution of landownership on educational
expenditure does not re￿ ect the adverse e⁄ect of the discrimination in the South (where land inequality is
more pronounced), on educational expenditure.42 The ￿nal control, the percentage of urban population is
40The precise age ranges used in each census vary, but as these changes are common to all states, this does not introduce any
bias into the results. The available age ranges are 5-17 years old in 1880, 5-20 years in 1900, 7-20 years in 1920, and 5-19 years
in 1950
41The total population of school-age children in each state, rather than the actual number of students, is used because states
could control their total expenditures by limiting the number of actual pupils (e.g., the exclusion of blacks from public education
in the South during much of the period under study).
42 Black students often su⁄ered not only from insu¢ cient funding but were also excluded from the education system entirely
in many places. Margo (1990) identi￿es several avenues along which black students su⁄ered in relation to their white peers
during the periods of the study. Blacks also lived predominantly in the South, where land inequality was relatively high as
a result of the plantation system. An additional avenue of in￿uence for the black population (and labor in general) involves
mobility. Wright (1986) argued that some Southern states limited education spending because of the fear that the educated
workers would migrate out of their home states. However, while the amount of internal migration was large in absolute terms,
relative to the size of the population it was much less important. Eldridge and Thomas (1957) calculate an index of interstate
redistribution, which measures the percent of the population that would have to be moved in any decade in order to match the
previous decades distribution by state. In 1900-1910, this index is 4.25%, and then is lower in every decade through 1940-1950.
As this index also re￿ects changes in population distribution due to fertility di⁄erences between states, it overestimates the
e⁄ect of internal migration. It thus seems likely that there was appreciable friction to labor mobility, and that local education
expenditures could, to some extent, bene￿t local populations. Including net migration rates from Eldridge and Thomas (1957)
23added for several reasons. Given economies of scale, it may be that more urbanized states in fact have
lower expenditures per child due to their higher density. Furthermore, urbanization and industrialization
are highly correlated, and urbanization may partly control for capital intensity across states and the higher
demand for human capital in the urban sector.43
6.2 Empirical Speci￿cations and Results
The empirical analysis examines the e⁄ect of inequality in the distribution of landownership (i.e., the land
share of large landowners) in state i in period t￿1; on log expenditure per child in state i in period t, lneit;
over four periods of observation: 1880, 1900, 1920 and 1940.44 In particular, for t = 1900;1920;1940; and
t ￿ 1 = 1880;1900;1920; respectively,
lneit = ￿0 + ￿1Si;t￿1 + ￿2 lnyi;t￿1 + ￿3Ui;t￿1 + ￿4Bi;t￿1 + vit (39)
where Si;t￿1 is the land share of large farms in state i in period t ￿ 1, lnyi;t￿1 is the log income per capita
in state i in period t￿1, Ui;t￿1 is the percentage of the urban population in state i in period t￿1, Bi;t￿1 is
the percentage of the black population in state i in period t￿1, and vit is the error term of state i in period
t ￿ 1. This formulation captures the existence of a lag between the current economic conditions and their
e⁄ect on the political structure and the implementation of educational policy.
There are several concerns in exploiting cross-states variations in the distribution of land ownership,
and education expenditures to assess the e⁄ect of inequality in the distribution of land ownership on education
expenditure.
First, an unobserved factor at the state level, which is correlated with the distribution of landown-
ership, may have a⁄ected education expenditure. In order to overcome this concern we examine the ￿rst
di⁄erence of equation (39), and estimate the e⁄ect of changes in land concentration on changes in education
expenditures. This strategy permits the estimation of the parameter of interest, ￿1, while allowing for a
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity across states in the level of the log expenditure per child.
Second, an unobserved factor at the state level may have a⁄ected both the changes in the distribu-
tion of landownership and the changes in education expenditure. Our empirical strategy allows for linear
unobserved heterogeneity across states in the time trend of log expenditure per child. Thus, the estimation
of the e⁄ect of changes in land concentration on changes in education expenditures with state ￿xed e⁄ects,
controls for a linear unobserved heterogeneity across states in the time trend of the log expenditure per child.
Namely, we presume that changes in explanatory variables are not correlated with changes in the error term,
even if the levels of the explanatory variables might be correlated with it. Although we do not control for
a non-linear state trend, as will become apparent, the coe¢ cient of interest is robust to the inclusion of the
linear time trend, and thus one should not expect the non-linear speci￿cation to a⁄ect the signi￿cance of the
results.
as part of the empirical speci￿cations that follow do not alter the results.
43The theory predicts that the size of the capital stock interacts with inequality in landownership to determine the nature of
education expenditure. While the measures of the aggregate capital stock per person by state is available, the inferences of the
theory are about capital holdings by landowners, that is unavailable. Regardless, inclusion of the (log) aggregate capital stock
per person in place of, or in addition to, the urban percentage does not alter any of the empirical results that follow. Moreover,
the use of income per capita controls for some of the e⁄ect of capital per worker as well.
44An alternate speci￿cation would be to examine the e⁄ect on the log of total expenditure lnEit as opposed to the log of
expenditure per child lneit. This would eliminate any concern that expenditures per child were changing due to random
￿uctuations in the size of the population. Regressions using lnEit as the dependent variable, and including the size of the log
child population, as an explanatory variable, do not alter the results qualitatively.
24Third, one may be concerned about potential reverse causality from education expenditure to inequal-
ity in landownership. This concern is addressed in several dimensions. We regress education expenditure, eit,
on lagged concentration of landownership, Si;t￿1. The lagging allows for some control of potential reverse
causality running from education expenditures to the land share of the largest farms. (i.e., it is reasonable
that S in 1900 will a⁄ect e in 1920, but unlikely that S in 1920 will a⁄ect e in 1900). However, we might still
capture reverse causation if there is serial correlation in education expenditures. This concern is handled
in 3 di⁄erent ways: (a) Since we estimate the e⁄ect of changes in land concentration on changes in educa-
tion expenditures, the concern is the presence of serial correlation in the changes in education expenditure.
However, we ￿nd that there is no serial correlation in the di⁄erence of education expenditures (while there
is serial correlation in the level of education expenditures). (b) We control for state speci￿c time trends in
education expenditure. (c) An instrument for concentration of land ownership is developed that provides us
with exogenous variation in the concentration of landownership, St￿1; and permits us to establish the causal
e⁄ect of land inequality on education expenditures.
Thus, we allow for a time invariant unobserved heterogeneity across states in the level of the log
expenditure per child, ￿i; and a linear unobserved heterogeneity across states in the time trend of the log
expenditure per child, ￿it, as well as variations in the time e⁄ect at the national level, ￿t: Namely,
vit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿it + "it: (40)
First di⁄erencing (39) and utilizing (40) it follows that
￿lneit = ￿1￿Si;t￿1 + ￿2￿lnyi;t￿1 + ￿3￿Ui;t￿1 + ￿4￿Bi;t￿1 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿i + ￿"it (41)
where ￿lneit ￿ lneit+1 ￿ lneit (i.e. the di⁄erence in the log expenditure per child in state i between 1920
and 1900, and between 1940 and 1920), ￿Si;t￿1 ￿ Si;t ￿ Si;t￿1 (i.e., the di⁄erence in land share of large
farms in state i between 1900 and 1880, and between 1920 and 1900), and ￿￿t￿1 = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1. The lag
operator is similarly de￿ned for the rest of the explanatory variables. Given the empirical speci￿cation (41)
and the available data, we have two possible observations for each state. Due to limitations in the data we
have 79 total observations over 41 states, with three states having data only from 1920 and 1940.
The negative correlation between the changes in the log of education expenditure in state i, ￿lneit,
and the lagged changes in land share of large farms in state i, ￿Si;t￿1; is apparent in Figure 3, and is
demonstrated by the ￿tted values plotted from an OLS regression.
25Table 1: Correlations of Variables
￿lneit ￿Si;t￿1 ￿lnyi;t￿1 ￿Bi;t￿1 ￿Ui;t￿1
￿lneit 1.000
￿Si;t￿1 -0.324** 1.000
￿lnyi;t￿1 0.411** -0.013 1.000
￿Bi;t￿1 -0.460** 0.173 -0.173 1.000
￿Ui;t￿1 -0.034 0.322** 0.112 -0.250** 1.000
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Figure 3. Changes in Education Expenditure per Child and Changes in the
Concentration in Landownership.
Table 1 depicts the correlation between all variables utilized in the empirical speci￿cations, in particu-
lar, the correlation coe¢ cient between ￿lneit and ￿Si;t￿1, as depicted in Figure 3. The table indicates that
lagged changes in the land share of large farms are negatively related to changes in education expenditures
per child in the next period. Moreover, changes in education expenditures are positively associated with the
lagged changes in log income per capita and negatively with the lagged changes in the percentage of the
black population.
To undertake more rigorous empirical testing, we begin by assuming that E(￿"it) = 0 and E(￿"it￿X) =
0, where X ￿ (Si;t￿1;lnyi;t￿1;Ui;t￿1,Bi;t￿1): In other words, we presume that the changes in explanatory
variables are not correlated with changes in the error term, even though the levels of the explanatory vari-
ables might be correlated with the error term itself in (39). In addition, we begin by assuming that the
time trend parameter, ￿i, is identical across states. Under these assumptions the speci￿cation in (41) can
be estimated by OLS, with standard errors adjusted for clustering by state, allowing for the di⁄erenced error
26terms for state i, ￿"it, to be correlated across di⁄erent time periods.
Table 2 depicts the results of this estimation in columns (1) ￿ (5), establishing the negative e⁄ect
of the lagged change in land share of large farms, ￿Si;t￿1 on the change in log education expenditure per
capita ￿lneit, alone and while controlling for the change in lagged income per capita, ￿lnyi;t￿1; the lagged
change in the percentage of the urban population, ￿Ui;t￿1; and the lagged change in percentage of the
black population, ￿Bi;t￿1: As indicated by the results in column (1) the e⁄ect of ￿Si;t￿1 alone on the
change in education expenditure, ￿lneit, is negative and highly signi￿cant. One would also expect that
changes in education expenditures would re￿ ect changes in income per capita. Controlling for the change
in lagged income per capita, ￿lnyi;t￿1 in column (2); shows that indeed an increase in lagged income per
capita has a highly signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on education expenditure. Nevertheless, the negative e⁄ect
of ￿Si;t￿1 on the change in education expenditure, ￿lneit, remains stable and highly signi￿cant. Column
(3) includes a control for the lagged change in percentage of the black population, ￿Bi;t￿1; to ensure that
the adverse e⁄ect of inequality in the distribution of landownership on educational expenditure does not
re￿ ect the adverse e⁄ect of the discrimination in the South (where land inequality is more pronounced), on
educational expenditure. As expected the e⁄ect of the change in the percentage of the black population on
the change in educational expenditure is negative and highly signi￿cant. However, the e⁄ect of the change in
the distribution of land ownership remains negative and highly signi￿cant. Finally column (4) adds a control
for the lagged change in the percentage of the urban population, ￿Ui;t￿1; capturing a potential adverse
e⁄ect of urbanization on education expenditure due to economies of scale in education, and its positive e⁄ect
steaming from the correlation between industrialization and urbanization. The e⁄ect of the lagged changes
in urbanization on changes in education expenditure is negative but insigni￿cant. The negative e⁄ect of
￿Si;t￿1 on the change in education expenditure remains stable, negative, and highly signi￿cant. Column (5)
establishes that the inclusion of a common time trend for all states does not a⁄ect the qualitative results,
increasing slightly the absolute value of the point estimate on ￿Si;t￿1.
Hence, as follows from (39) and (41) the coe¢ cient ￿1 that measures the e⁄ect of the lagged change in
land share of large farms, ￿Si;t￿1; on the change in log education expenditure per capita ￿lneit, captures
the e⁄ect of the lagged land share of large farms, Si;t￿1 on log education expenditure per capita lneit. The
size of the point estimate for Si;t￿1 is relatively stable over the ￿rst ￿ve speci￿cations, suggesting that a
ten percentage point decline in Si;t￿1 would have increased expenditure per child at the following period
by 21-27%. In particular, consider the di⁄erence between the land share of large farms in California and
Vermont in 1920. In California S1920 = 0:096 (which is at the 25th percentile of the distribution of S across
states in the US) and in Vermont S1920 = 0:215 (which is at the 75th percentile). Using the estimates in
column (4) this implies that Vermont￿ s expenditure per child in 1920 would have been 25% higher if it had a
land share of large farms as small as California￿ s. That di⁄erence would have eliminated more than a third
of the actual gap in expenditure per child that existed between California ($68 per child) and Vermont ($41
per child) in 1940.
Column (6) reports the estimation of equation (41) using state ￿xed e⁄ects, allowing for the time trend
in education expenditures, ￿i; to vary by state, where all control variables are included. In comparison to
column (4) and (5) the absolute value of the point estimate of the e⁄ect of the change in the lagged land
share of large farms has increased, but it is signi￿cant only at the 10% level, re￿ ecting the reduction in
the degrees of freedom. A rise in standard errors and a decline in signi￿cance is also observed in all other
explanatory variables. The results in column (6) may seem to indicate that there is some state-speci￿c time
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Dep. Variable: Change in log educational expend per child (￿lneit)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Exp. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
change in land concentration -2.71*** -2.67*** -2.16*** -2.12*** -2.34*** -3.68*
(￿Si;t￿1) (0.99) (0.86) (0.75) (0.78) (0.80) (2.17)
change in income per capita 0.84*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.71*
(￿lnyi;t￿1) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.41)
change in % of the black pop. -3.74*** -3.78*** -2.90*** -5.13**
(￿Bi;t￿1) (0.59) (0.73) (0.96) (2.17)
change in % of the urban pop. -0.05 -0.66* -0.12
(￿Ui;t￿1) (0.32) (0.40) (0.69)
National time ￿xed e⁄ects No No No No Yes No
State ￿xed e⁄ects (linear time trend) No No No No No Yes
R2 0.11 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.38
Hausman Statistic 2.16
Hausman p-value 0.71
Notes: *** denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering
at the state level. All regressions have 79 total observations, from 41 states. The null hypothesis of the Hausman
test in column (6) is that there is no systematic di⁄erence in the point estimates between columns (4) and (6); the
statistic is distributed ￿2 (4). Data on log education expenditures per child (lneit) is from the years1900, 1920, and
1940, and data for all explanatory variables, is lagged, taken from the the years 1880, 1900, and 1920.
28trend and that previously the change in the land share of large farms was proxying for this state-speci￿c
e⁄ect. However the Hausman test, report in column (6) of table 2, comparing the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation to
a random e⁄ects estimation indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two speci￿cations
di⁄er only randomly.45
Since the model abstracts from inequality among landowners, the use of the explanatory variable, S
(i.e., the land share of large farms), is appropriate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the use of the
Gini coe¢ cient for farms size (i.e. , land inequality among landowners), calculated using the same raw data
used in creating the variable S, would not a⁄ect the qualitative results. In particular, if S is replaced by
the Gini coe¢ cient for inequality in landownership, land inequality still has an adverse e⁄ect on education
expenditure. Furthermore, if both measures are used jointly, then the coe¢ cient of land share of large farms
remains negative (-2.15) and signi￿cant at the 1% level, and the e⁄ect of the Gini coe¢ cient also remains
negative although insigni￿cant.
6.3 Instrumental Variables Estimation
This section introduces an instrumental variables analysis to further enhance con￿dence about the identi￿-
cation of the e⁄ect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure. In order to identify the
e⁄ect of the concentration of landownership on education, we require a source of exogenous variation in the
concentration of land inequality that does not in￿ uence education spending directly. In light of the histori-
cal evidence provided by Engerman and Sokolo⁄ (2000), regarding the positive e⁄ects of agricultural crops
associated with economies of scale (e.g., cotton and sugar cane) on land inequality across the Western Hemi-
sphere, one should expect that cross-state di⁄erences in climatic characteristics, and thus in the suitability
for such crops, would generate variation in the concentration in landownership across states. Moreover, na-
tionwide changes in the relative prices of agricultural crops that are associated with economies of scale would
generate changes in the concentration of landownership over time. Thus, the interaction between nationwide
changes in the relative prices of agricultural crops that are associated with economies of scale and variation
in climatic characteristics across states (that are static in this short time period) would generate di⁄erences
in the evolution of land concentration across states.
To illustrate the di⁄erential e⁄ect of agricultural prices over time on the concentration of landown-
ership across states, consider the evolution of price of cotton relative to the price of corn over the period
1880-1940, as obtained from the NBER Macrohistory Database (2007). The price of cotton relative to corn
declined monotonically over the period of our study. The price of a pound of cotton relative to a bushel
of corn was 0.321 in 1880, 0.252 in 1900, 0.236 in 1920, and 0.155 in 1940, and indeed over this period,
in regions that were climatically more receptive to cotton production, the concentration of land ownership
held by the largest farms declined. In particular, 29 states produced no cotton in 1860, and their average
change in land concentration was just -0.2% over period 1880-1940. Among states that produced some
cotton in 1860, the average change in the land concentration of the largest landowners was -2.6%. Cotton
production was most prevalent in the South, with this single crop accounting for over 40% of the total value
of agricultural production in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Texas. Over this period the concentration of land ownership by the largest farms declined in the South
45Hence, the Hausman test indicates that the random e⁄ects speci￿cation is preferred. Furthermore, it is important to note
that for this sample of data, the random e⁄ects estimates are identical to the OLS results we report in column (4), due to the
fact that the estimated variance in ￿i is zero.
29Table 3: Instrumental Variable Speci￿cations for Changes in Per Child Education Expenditure
Dep. Variable: Change in log educational expend per child (￿lneit)
OLS 2SLS
Exp. Variables (1) (2)
change in land concentration -2.34*** -3.23***
(￿Si;t￿1) (0.80) (0.91)
change in income per capita 0.72*** 0.72***
(￿lnyi;t￿1) (0.17) (0.17)
change in % of the black pop. -2.90*** -2.58***
(￿Bi;t￿1) (0.96) (0.92)
change in % of the urban pop. -0.66* -0.51
(￿Ui;t￿1) (0.40) (0.37)
National time ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes
R2 0.48
First stage F-statistic 13.49
First stage p-value <0.001
Sargan test statistic 1.20
Sargan test p-value 0.27
Notes: *** denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering
at the state level. All regressions have 79 total observations, from 41 states. Data on log education expenditures
per child (lneit) are from 1900, 1920, and 1940, and data for all control variables is from 1880, 1900, and 1920.
In column (2), the instruments for the di⁄erence in land concentration (￿Si;t￿1) are two variables that interact
state-speci￿c climate conditions with the price of cotton relative to the price of corn.. The F-test in column (2)
tests the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient on both instruments in the ￿rst stage is zero; the statistic is distributed
F (2;72): The Sargan test has a null hypothesis that both instruments are uncorrelated with the error term; the
statistic is distributed ￿2 (1).
from 20% in 1880 to 12% in 1900 and to only 8% in 1920.
Our instruments, are therefore, the interaction between state-speci￿c, but time invariant, climatic
conditions and the nationwide changes in the price of cotton relative to corn.46 The climatic measures are
derived from state data on temperature, rainfall, and a measure of heating days (capturing the variability of
temperature throughout the year) obtained from the National Climatic Data Center (2007). As elaborated
in Appendix D, using principal components two distinct climatic measures are extracted from this data.
The interaction of these with the relative price data provides us with state-year speci￿c instruments for the
concentration of land ownership.
These instruments appear to satisfy the exclusion restriction, since there is no evidence that the human
capital intensity in the production of cotton over this period di⁄ers from the average in all other agricultural
crops, and changes in the relative price of cotton, therefore, would not have a direct e⁄ect on education
expenditure, but only indirectly through their e⁄ect on concentration of landownership, and possibly via
changes in income, that are controlled for in the regressions.
The lagged di⁄erences of the instruments are used within a two-stage least squares estimation to
supply exogenous variation in the lagged di⁄erence of Si;t￿1. Included in our speci￿cation are the lagged
46The use of the price of cotton relative to wheat does not a⁄ect the results.
30di⁄erences in log income per capita, the percent black, the percent urban, and period speci￿c dummies.
Column (1) of table 3 replicates the OLS results for comparison purposes, and column (2) reports the second
stage results of the two-stage least squares estimation. As can be seen, the point estimate is now larger in
absolute value than in the OLS estimates, and remains signi￿cant at the 1% level.
The ￿rst stage results show that our instruments are quite strong in explaining variation in ￿Si;t￿1.
As reported in the table, the F-test of the joint signi￿cance of the instruments has a value of 13.49, which is
signi￿cant at less than 0.1%. Both instruments are individually signi￿cant in the ￿rst stage at 1%. As we
have two instruments, there is the possibility of overidenti￿cation. However, a Sargan test of overidenti￿-
cation, as noted in the table, cannot reject the null hypothesis that both instruments are uncorrelated with
the error term ￿"it.
The results provide further support that we have identi￿ed a causal adverse e⁄ect of the concentration
of land ownership on the provision of education across states during this period of U.S. history.
7 Concluding Remarks
The proposed theory suggests that the concentration of land ownership has been a major hurdle in the
emergence of human capital promoting institutions and economic growth. The rise in the demand for human
capital in the process of industrialization and its e⁄ect on human capital formation and on the onset of
the demographic transition have been the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to growth. As the
demand for human capital emerged, di⁄erences concentration of land ownership across countries generated
variations in the extensiveness of human capital formation and therefore in the rapidity of technological
progress and the timing of the demographic transition, contributing to the emergence of the great divergence
in income per capita across countries. Land abundance, which was bene￿cial in early stages of development,
generated in later stages a hurdle for human capital accumulation and economic growth among countries in
which land ownership was unequally distributed, bringing about changes in the ranking of countries in the
world income distribution.
The central hypothesis of this research that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely
a⁄ected the timing of education reform is examined and con￿rmed empirically, utilizing variations in the
distribution of land ownership and educational expenditure across states in the US during the high school
movement. Furthermore, historical evidence suggests that consistent with the proposed hypothesis, land
reforms in Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan were associated with signi￿cant education reforms, and that
variations in distribution of land ownership across and within North and South America have been a signif-
icant force in the emergence of sustained di⁄erences in human capital formation and economic growth.
The paper implies that di⁄erences in the evolution of social structures across countries may re￿ ect
di⁄erences in the distribution of land ownership. In particular, the dichotomy between workers and capitalists
is more likely to persist in land abundant economies in which land ownership is unequally distributed. As
argued by Galor and Moav (2006), due to the complementarity between physical and human capital in
production, the Capitalists were among the prime bene￿ciaries of the accumulation of human capital by
the masses. They had therefore the incentive to ￿nancially support public education that would sustain
their pro￿t rates and would improve their economic well being, although would ultimately undermine their
dynasty￿ s position in the social ladder and would bring about the demise of the capitalist-workers class
structure. As implied by the current research, the timing and the extent of this social transformation
31depend on the economic interest of landlords. In contrast to the Marxian hypothesis, this paper suggests
that workers and capitalists are the natural economic allies that share an interest in industrial development
and therefore in the implementation of growth enhancing human capital promoting institutions, whereas
landlords are the prime hurdle for industrial development and social mobility.
32Appendix 1. Landowners Preferred Tax Rate: Cobb-Douglas Agricultural Technology
Lemma 3 The elasticity of ￿t with respect to yM
t , e￿t;yM
t 2 (0;1):
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that e￿t;yM
t ￿ 0: Since wt = (1 ￿ ￿)yM
t =￿t a rise in yM
t and a decline
in ￿t imply a rise in w and a reduction in the optimal number of workers in agriculture and hence a rise
in ￿t: A contradiction. Suppose that e￿t;yM
t ￿ 1: since wt = (1 ￿ ￿)yM
t =￿t a rise in yM
t and a more than
proportional rise in ￿t implies a decline in wt and a rise in the optimal number of workers in agriculture and
hence a decline in ￿t: A contradiction. ￿




t = 2 (0;￿￿
t):
Proof. As follows from (3), noting that Lt = 1 ￿ ￿t;
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Since the wage paid to each worker is equal in the two sectors, it follows from (42) that
(1 ￿ ￿)AX￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿t; (45)
and hence






Note that ￿t is determined endogenously such that ￿t 2 (0;1):
Since landlord￿ s income in period t is IL
t = wt +(1￿￿t)RtbL
t￿1 +￿tX=￿; it follows that the aggregate
income of landowners, ￿IL
t , is
￿IL
t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿t + sL
t ￿￿t￿t + X￿t; (47)
where wt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿t; is the wage, ￿￿t￿t = ￿yM
t is the share of capital in the industrial output, and sL
t is
the share of capital owned by landowners. Substituting (44) and (46) into (47)
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￿(1￿￿) landlords income is strictly increasing in ￿t and it follows from Lemma 3 that
landowners prefer the highest possible value for yM






















￿(1￿￿); landowners income is a convex function of ￿t; implying they prefer either the
maximal or the minimal value of ￿t. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 3 that landowners prefer the highest
or lowest possible value for yM
t ; and hence ￿L
t = 2 (0;￿￿
t): ￿
Appendix 2. Construction of the Land Share Distribution Variables
The Census reports the distribution of number of farms by bin size (e.g., less than 20 acres, 20-49
acres, 50-99 acres, 100-499 acres, 500-999 acres, and greater than 1000 acres). Since the Censuses do not
report identical bin sizes for 1880, 1900, and 1920, we aggregate farms into the previously listed six categories
that are comparable across years.
To calculate Sit, we require information on the actual size of farms within each size category reported
by the Census, but this is not directly available in 1880 or 1900. We therefore assume that each farm within
a given category is of the average size of that category. For example, each farm in the range 20-49 acres
is assumed to be 34.5 acres. For the category of farms greater than 1000 acres, we assume that each farm
is exactly 1000 acres. The results are not sensitive to alternate choices. While data on farm size within
categories is available for 1920, it does not di⁄er greatly from the assumed average values, and the results
are not sensitive to the use of the actual farm size data for 1920.
Initially we calculate a Gini coe¢ cient of farm size distribution. There are N size categories, numbered
from 1 to 6 in order of increasing size of farms. Let fi be the share of all farms that are in category i. Let
ai be the share of all acreage that is in category i. Let Fi =
Pi
s=1 fs, denotes the share of farms that are
of size i or smaller. Similarly, Ai =
Pi
s=1 as. By de￿nition, F6 = A6 = 1. It can be shown that the Gini
coe¢ cient, G, can be calculated as follows
G = 1 ￿
5 X
i=1
(Fi+1 ￿ Fi)(Ai+1 + Ai):
To perform our calculations of Sit; the land share of the largest landowners, we use a simple parameter-
ization of the Lorenz curve. This is denoted sL = s
￿
F where sL is the share of land and sF is the share of farms.
The parameter ￿ is related to the Gini coe¢ cient in the following manner, ￿ = (1 + G)=(1￿G). Thus given
the Gini coe¢ cient we can derive the parameter ￿ for each state. Given ￿, we calculate the minimum number






Farms1880 is the total number of farms in 1880, ￿ is the Lorenz parameter from 1880, and TopFarms1880 is
the number of large farms constituting 20% of all land. Note that we can utilize other choice of percentage
(i.e. 5%, 10%, etc..) in place of 20%.
We can then track how the share of land held by the largest number of farms evolves over time, where
the number of these farms is held constant at TopFarms1880. By construction, this share of land is 20%
in 1880. For subsequent years, the share can be calculated as Sit = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ TopFarmsi;1880=Farmsit)
￿it
where Farmsit measures the total number of farms in year t, and ￿it measures the coe¢ cient on the Lorenz
curve from year t in state i. One advantage of this calculation is that it is independent of the average farm
size between states, which varies incredibly across the United States based on geographic conditions rather
than di⁄erences in inequality.
The current method allows for a smooth distribution of farm sizes over the whole range of farms.
However, we could alternately calculate the Sit variable by going directly to the size distribution data in
the U.S. Census. This would assume that each farm within each size category of farm is of an identical
size. Starting from the largest bin size (greater than 1000 acres) in 1880 and working down the bin sizes
34if necessary, we count how many farms account for 20% of farm land. We can then take this number
of top farms in subsequent years and ask how much land is accounted for by this same number of farms,
again working from the top of the distribution down. One disadvantage of this method is that it depends
on the assumed average size of farms over 1000 acres, which is not reported by the U.S. Census. The
parameterization method we utilize is less sensitive to this lack of information.
Appendix 3. Data Sources
Education Expenditures - This is obtained from the Historical Statistics of the United States for 1920 and
1940, and from the U.S. Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900. These
expenditures were converted to 1920 dollars using the GDP de￿ ator from Bilke and Gordon (1989).
Expenditure per Child - The number of children in a year is taken from the U.S. Census. Consistent across
all states, the available age ranges are 5-20 years in 1900 and 7-20 years in 1920.
Income per Capita - These are estimates Richard Easterlin (1957), Population Redistribution and Economic
Growth: United States 1870-1950, edited by Kuznets and Thomas. Details of the construction can be
obtained from this source. Income per capita is converted to 1920 dollars using the GDP de￿ ator from Bilke
and Gordon (1989).
Percent Black - This is taken from the U.S. Census for the relevant years
Percent Urban - From the U.S. Census for the relevant years.
Regions - The Northeast is de￿ned as: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Maine, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Midwest is: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The South is: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia and West Virginia. The West includes: California, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming.
Excluded States - States that are not included in the sample due to data limitations are: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma.
Appendix 4. Construction of Instruments
The instruments used to identify the e⁄ect of land distribution on education is composed of a geo-
graphic element and a relative price element. The geographic element is derived from state level data on
temperature, rainfall, and heating requirements obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC), speci￿cally the U.S. Climate Normals. The Climate Normals provide annual
average temperature and rainfall for individual climatic regions within states. Annual heating requirements
are derived from the average pattern of temperatures throughout the year, and capture the intensity of
temperature di⁄erences within the year (as opposed to the simple average). The heating requirements are
reported by regions within states as well. For each measure, the value reported is the average value over
the years 1931 through 2000.
To calculate state level values, the regional data is weighted within each state by the area of the region
as reported by the NCDC. Examining the data, the three measures of climate are signi￿cantly correlated
with each other. The correlation of temperature with heating days is -0.99, temperature with rainfall is
-0.49, and rainfall with heating days is 0.48. All correlations are signi￿cant at less than 1%. Using these
three colinear terms together may falsely in￿ ate the signi￿cance of the ￿rst stage regressions, so to extract the
most explanatory power from the climate data while limiting the number of variables, a principal components
analysis is used. The ￿rst component accounts for 78% of the variation observed in the three variables,
with an eigenvalue of 2.35. The loadings on the ￿rst component are 0.628 for heating days, -0.630 for
temperature, and 0.457 for annual rainfall. The second component accounts for 21% of total variation, with
an eigenvalue of 0.64. The loadings are -0.327 for heating days, 0.319 for temperature, and 0.890 for annual
rainfall. Combined, the two principal components capture 99% of the variation in climatic data, with the
￿rst component picking up mainly variation associated with temperature and the second component picking
up mainly rainfall.
The two climatic components are state speci￿c, and time invariant. To generate a time-varying
instrument, we have combined the climate data with information on the relative price of cotton. As
explained in the text, the concept is that increases in cotton prices would induce land concentration, but
only in those places which were geographically suited to cotton production in the ￿rst place. The price data
comes from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Macrohistory Database. Historical price
levels for cotton are obtained as an average of the monthly wholesale price from New York (NBER series
04006), in cents per pound. These prices are 12.04 cents in 1880, 9.64 in 1900, 33.90 in 1920, and 10.38 in
1940. The price of corn, also an average of monthly wholesale prices from Chicago (NBER series 04005),
in dollars per bushel. The speci￿c prices are 0.375 dollars in 1880, 0.383 dollars in 1900, 1.439 in 1920 and
0.670 in 1940.
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